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Lewin: Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber

BOOK REVIEW
CALABRESI'S REVENGE?
JUNK SCIENCE IN
THE WORK OF PETER HUBER*
Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the
Courtroom, BasicBooks, 1991 (228 pages, plus notes & index).
Jeff L Lewin"
Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom' ("Revenge")
has generated substantial publicity for Peter Huber's indictment of the
judicial system for allowing pseudoscientific charlatans to dominate
modem tort litigation.2 Revenge is a good read. Huber outrages his
audience with well-written horror stories about erroneous jury verdicts
based on bad science, from cancer "caused" by a bruise, to a
soothsayer's loss of psychic powers "caused" by a CAT scan.
Huber is not alone in his concern about the problem of translating complex scientific evidence to lay factfinders within our adversary
system. Academic commentators have written dozens of articles and
books addressing the general topic of the role of expert witnesses in
litigation3 and the specific question of the standards governing the

©

1992, Jeff L. Lewin.

Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. Many thanks to Marjorie McDiarmid for helpful comments on an earlier manuscript, and also to Howard Kaufman,
M.D. for calling the book to my attention and for sharing his perspective on the tort system.
1. PETER W. HUBER, GALEo's REvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN ThE COURTROOM (1991)
**

[hereinafter REVcE].

2. See, e.g., Mo Geyelin, Tort Bar's Scourge: Star of Legal Reform Kindles Controversy But Collects Critics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1992, at Al. A NEXIS search through the
end of 1992 yielded 16 items in the major papers (MAJPAP) file and 33 articles in the
current (CURRNT) file that mention the book, most of which are reviews of the book or
articles on the subject of junk science.

3. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43; Samuel
R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1113.
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admissibility of scientific evidence.4
Scientific evidence has played a major role in recent high-profile
litigation in which the judiciary has been forced to grapple with the
admissibility of new scientific aids to criminal investigation5 and
controversial expert testimony that attributes various ailments to particular drugs or chemicals.' In the Bendectin litigation, the federal
courts have taken a variety of inconsistent approaches to the admissi-

4. See, e.g., Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
595 (1988); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980); Kenneth R. Kreiling, Scientific Evidence: Toward Providing the Lay Trier with the Comprehensible and Reliable Evidence
Necessary to Meet the Goals of the Rules of Evidence, 32 ARM.L. REV. 915 (1990); Mark
McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IoWA L. REV.
879 (1982); Andre A. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the
Frye Rule, 25 WM.& MARY L. REV. 545 (1984). Other important works appear in two
ABA-sponsored symposia: Rules for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79 (1987)
(including proposals by Fredric I. Lederer, Margaret A. Berger, James E. Starrs, and Paul C.
Giannelli, with commentary and panel discussion); Symposium on Science and the Rules of
Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187 (1983) (including papers by Paul C. Giannelli and Stephen A.
Saltzburg, with discussion). Additional articles are cited in PAUL C. GIANNELU & EDWARD J.
IMWINKEaRJED, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE § 1-9, at 46-47 (1986 & Supp. 1991), and in Michael
C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable"? Analyzing the Expert Witness's
Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350
(1992).
5. Commentators have noted the recent proliferation of scientific evidence in criminal
cases. Edward J. Imwinkelhied, The Standardfor Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique
From the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VIL L. REV. 554 (1982-83); Giannelli, supra
note 4, at 1198 ("Neutron activation analysis, sound spectrometry (voiceprints),
psycholinguistics, atomic absorption, remote electromagnetic sensing, and bitemark comparisons
are but a sample ... ."). Recent examples include United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786
(2d Cir.) (DNA profiling), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d
129 (Alaska 1986) (hypnotically-refreshed testimony); Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429 (Ark.
1991) (DNA print analysis); State v. Miller, 522 A.2d 249 (Conn. 1987) (polygraph); State v.
Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989) (DNA print analysis).
6. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Depo-Provera
and birth defects); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (nickel and cadmium fumes in workplace and cancer), cerL denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280
(1992); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990) (PCBs and various
illnesses), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991); Novak v. United States, 865 F.2d 718 (6th
Cir. 1989) (swine flu vaccine and dermatomyositis); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855
F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (hazardous chemicals leaking from landfill into drinking water and
various ailments, including "immune system impairment"); Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical
Corp., 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.) (spermicide and birth defects), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950
(1986); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Agent
Orange and various ailments), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1234 (1988); Perry v. United States, 755 F.2d 888 (lth Cir. 1985) (swine flu vaccine and
encephalitis); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.) (herbicide paraquat
and pulmonary fibrosis), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Rubanick v. Witeo Chem. Corp.,
593 A.2d 733 (NJ. 1991) (PCBs and colon cancer).
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bility of expert testimony on the causal link between the plaintiffs'
birth defects and their mothers' ingestion of the anti-nausea drug
Bendectin during pregnancy.7 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve the split among the circuits in the Bendectin cases,
accepting review of the Ninth Circuit's Daubert opinion that cited
Revenge in support of its decision to uphold the exclusion of testimony by the plaintiffs' expert, whose methodology was found to be
inconsistent with the generally accepted procedures of recognized
authorities. 9
Revenge has also carried the issue of junk science into the realm
of politics. Under the leadership of former Vice-President Dan
Quayle, the President's Council on Competitiveness included "expert

evidence reform" in its Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America."° Quayle adopted Huber's "junk science" rhetoric," and he cited Revenge in support of these proposals.2 The 1992 Republican
platform included a promise to "throw out 'junk science" from
American courtrooms. 3
7. See Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.) (summarizing Bendectin litigation), cert denied, 113 S. CL 84 (1992). Other appellate decisions
include Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
granted, 113 S. CL 320 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941
(3d Cir. 1990); Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied. 111
S. CL 370 (1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884
F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Richardson v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v.
Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990); In re
Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin7 Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985),
aff'd sub nom. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S.

1006 (1989).
8. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing Revenge), cert. granted, 113 S. CL 320 (1992). Numerous amicus briefs have been
filed in the case, and nine have been published by the Association of Trial Lawyers of
America ("ATLA") along with the petitioners' brief. ATLA, Compendium of Briefs Filed on
December 2, 1992 by the Petitioners and by Amici Curiae in Support of the Petitioners,
Together With the Joint Appendix, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., cert.
granted. 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992) (No. 92-102). The case was argued before the Supreme Court
in March of 1993.
9. Daubert, supra note 8, at 1131 (citing Revenge).
10. Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on
Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 247 (1992) (quoting and
discussing the Council's proposals).
11. See David S. Broder & Saundra Torry, ABA President Disputes Quayle onr Litigation
Proposals,WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1991, at Al.
12. Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L REV. 559, 565-66 (1992) (citing
Revenge).
13. 1992 Republican Plaform, 'Te Vision Shared: Uniting Our Family, Our Country,
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While Revenge has provided sound bytes for politicians, and
serves as a secondary authority for judicial citation, the book adds
little to the ongoing debate. Huber fails to prove his contentions
about the extent and origins of the problem of junk science because
his own methodology is little better than that of the charlatans he
criticizes.
I.

GALILEO'S REVENGE is JUNK LITIGATION SCIENCE

The central premise of Revenge is that junk science is flooding
our courtrooms because of the "let-it-all-in approach to expert testimony."14 In a section titled "Toward the Far Side," Huber likens the
new "scientific mystics, speculators, cranks, and iconoclasts" to characters from a Gary Larson cartoon, 15 each of whom "may claim, in
short, to be a new Galileo, a lonely, misunderstood genius who can
see wonders that others neither discern nor understand." 6 Huber attributes the profusion of junk science to the demise of the Frye
rule. 7 According to Huber, the Frye rule traditionally "allowed experts into court only if their testimony was founded on theories,
methods, and procedures 'generally accepted' as valid among other
scientists in the same field.""
Huber traces the "demise" of Frye to the 1975 adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"). The FRE undeniably liberalized
the treatment of expert testimony, and the FRE made no mention of
the Frye test. From this silence, Huber infers that "[m]ainstream scientific consensus didn't matter any more," 9 and he unequivocally
asserts that Frye is dead:
The academics (as academics are prone to do) have continued
to debate Frye's demise long after the debate has ceased to be of
any practical importance. Some insist that Frye still lives; others

Our Worl4" Approved by Republican National Convention Aug. 17, 1992, BNA DAILY
REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Aug. 18, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC file).
14. REVENGF, supra note 1, at 17.

15. Id.
16. Id at 16.
17. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18. REVENGE, supra note 1, at 14. The decision in Frye did not apply to all expert
testimony, but only to testimony based on a scientific device. Frye held that a primitive form
of lie detector was not sufficiently reliable to warrant introduction of the results into evidence
by the defendant. The courts have applied Frye more broadly, however, and it has come to
be viewed as a general rule applicable to all scientifically-based evidence.
19. Id.at 15-16.
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that it is dead and buried, others that, dead or alive, Frye no longer
makes any practical difference. But with Frye certifiably absent
from the rules of evidence, the academics might as well be debating
the survival of Elvis Presley in the indubitably silent halls of

Graceland. Whether or not Frye still lives, the conviction is gone,
the music has died. Most courts have slouched toward what federal
judge Patrick Higginbotham dubs the let-it-all-in approach to expert
testimony.
Huber is wrong, and he knows better. Frye is not dead. Many
courts continue to adhere to the Frye test by name.21 In most other
jurisdictions, Frye lives on under an assumed name: the "strict scruti-

ny" version of the FRE's "relevancy" test.' Under the relevancy test
of FRE 702, the trial judge must determine whether expert testimony
is "helpful" by balancing its probative value against its potential to
mislead the jury.' The probative value of expert evidence depends
on the reliability of both the underlying scientific theory or methodology (major premise) and the particular data (minor premise) on which
the expert's opinion is based.24 Whether or not the underlying scientific principles are generally accepted by experts in the field remains
important in assessing the reliability of scientific evidence, along with
such other factors as its degree of novelty in relationship to accepted

20. Id at 16-17.
21. See GIANNELU & IMWINKEIKE.i
, supra note 4, at § 1-5 n.44 (1991 supplement
cites five recent state opinions that follow Frye). Frye is still referred to as the majority rule,
even in state courts that decline to follow it. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 431
(Ark. 1991).
22. See GIANNEUI & IMWINKELRW:E,
supra note 4, § 1-6. Surveys of recent federal
case law appear in Turpin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 959 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir.),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 84 (1992), and in McCarthy, supra note 4.
23. GIANNELU & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 31; JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERIER, WEINSTEIN's EvDENcE,
702[03] (1992).
24. Edward J. Imwinkehied, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure
of Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L REV. 1 (1988). The courts have not always succeeded in
differentiating between analysis of the reliability of the scientific basis under FRE 702 and
the reliability of the factual basis under Rule 703. See McCarthy, supra note 4, at 387. "It
can be difficult to determine whether the putative problem with scientific evidence lies in the
underlying data itself or the method by which the data is analyzed." In re Paoli R.R. Yard
PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 856 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
In applying Rule 702, there exists a further question as to whether the trial court is
to determine the reliability of scientific knowledge as a "preliminary fact" according to the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of Rule 104(a), or the more relaxed "reasonable
trier of fact could find" standard of Rule 104(b). See Brief for a Group of American Law
Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 18-23, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., cert granted, 113 S. Ct 320 (1992) (No. 92-102) (advocating Rule
104(a) standard).
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principles, the extent to which it has been applied, the potential rate
of error, the existence of specialized literature, and the qualifications
of the particular expert witness.' A conscientious application of the
FRE's relevancy test should reject expert testimony based on unreliable scientific theories or unreliable data. Indeed, the result under the
Frye test and under a relevancy analysis often will be the same.2 6
In the penultimate chapter of Revenge, Huber concedes that "at
least some judges," a "growing number," are applying a strict version
of the relevancy test, but he nevertheless asserts that "many judges
still reject any such limits," leaving the reader with the impression
that junk science continues to dominate our courtrooms. 27 In a recent
law review adaptation of his book, 28 Huber uses the same cases to
tell a different story.29 In this article, Huber refers to a 1986 decision as "a major turning point in judicial attitude,"" and he concludes that "the more recent trend appears to be toward reaffirming
stricter standards against evidence from the fringes of the scientific
community."31 By way of contrast, on the last page of Revenge,
Huber's tone remains bitter and pessimistic:
It is not especially scientific to deny rules of evidence, to disdain
the formalisms of serious science, to sit back, let everything in, and
invite random groups of twelve stout citizens to vote as they please.
Such attitudes serve no one but the lawyers who act as impresarios

25. GIANNELU & IMWRNKELRIED, supra note 4, § 1-6, at 32; WEiNSTEIN & BEROER,
supra note 23, 1 702[03], at 702-41 to 702-42; McConnick, supra note 4, at 911-12. See,
e.g., United States v. Downing 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
702[03], at 702-44. Compare, e.g.,
26. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 23,
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (approving
exclusion of evidence based on Frye test), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992) with ia at
1119 (Clark, CJ., concurring in the result) (approving exclusion of evidence based on relevancy test).
27. REVENGE, supra note 1, at 204-05.
28. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAI. U. L REV. 723 (1992). An
efficient recycler, Huber is also including this material as a chapter in a forthcoming book on
scientific inference and the law.
29. Where the article differs from the book is in their respective descriptions of the
nature and extent of the problem of junk science in the courtroom. Compare Huber, supra
note 28, at 723-38 with REVENGE, supra note 1, generally. The second half of the article,
which discusses possible solutions to the problem of junk science, is essentially a verbatim
reproduction of chapter 11 of REVENGE. Compare Huber, supra note 28, at 739-55 with
REVENGE, supra note 1, at 194-213.
30. Huber, supra note 28, at 734. The decision in question is In re Air Crash Disaster,
795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986) (Higginbotham, J.).
31. Huber, supra note 28, at 736.
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and intermediaries and the fringe scientists in their pay.32

Thus, even though Huber's academic article concedes that the
turning point has been passed and that the recent trend is toward
stricter judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence, the rhetoric and structure of Revenge convey the ominous warning that junk science is out
of control in the courtroom and wreaking havoc on society. In sum,
writing for different audiences, Huber manipulates the same evidence
to reach diametrically opposite conclusions.
Huber's evaluation of the impact of junk science does not measure up to the standards of scientific methodology which he advocates
for others. Eschewing rigorous empirical investigation, Revenge is
entirely anecdotal. At the core of the work are over 100 pages of
horror stories about the legal system's mishandling of scientifically
untenable claims that various persons or entities were the cause of the
victims' damages.33
Compounding the anecdotal character of his evidence is the fact
that, despite Huber's overblown rhetoric, these stories do not reveal a
pattern of systematic judicial acceptance of junk science, nor do they
uniformly support his thesis that we face a serious threat from junk
science in the courtroom.' Huber can point to very few cases in
32. REVENGE, supra note 1, at 228.
33. The book's six central chapters describe the legal implications of six pseudo-scientific falsehoods: Chapter 3, "The Midas Touch"-cancer caused by physical injury; Chapter 4,
"Sudden Acceleration"-accidents caused by sudden acceleration of the Audi 5000; Chapter 5,
"Gadgets and Knives--cerebral palsy caused by birth trauma; Chapter 6, "No Immunity--chemically-induced immunodeficiency or "chemical AIDS"; Chapter 7, "Nausea-birth
defects caused by Bendectin; Chapter 8, "The Paranoia Plebiscite-recoveries for unfounded
fear of future medical problems, especially cancer and more recently AIDS.
Because of Huber's partisanship and his polemical tone, I was not always persuaded
by his evaluation of the underlying science. For example, the expert testimony supporting
plaintiffs' claims in the Bendectin litigation received a far more respectful evaluation in
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). Also, Huber
uniformly portrays the supposed experts and their attorneys as though all were consciously
perpetrating scientific fraud, making no effort to distinguish "junk science" from controversial
science, or charlatans from sincere believers.
34. For example, with respect to unwarranted claims of traumatically-induced cancer,
most of the cases arose in the context of worker compensation claims; as Huber recognizes,
the ultimate source of the problem was not junk science in the courtroom but rather the
limited scope of review of administrative findings in such cases when the loyal treating
physician had opined that the cancer was caused by the trauma. See REVENGE, supra note 1,
at 47. Moreover, Huber never establishes that the erroneous rulings for the plaintiffs were
contrary to the current scientific consensus. Huber says that courts began to rule against the
plaintiffs in the 1950s, and the stream of erroneous verdicts dried up by the 1970s, which
seems to correspond with the emergence of a scientific consensus on this point as reflected
in a 1974 publication which Huber cites. See id. at 52-56. While articles questioning the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:183

which plaintiffs ultimately prevailed on the basis of unsound expert
testimony. Instead, it appears that some of the plaintiffs' recoveries
were consistent with the contemporary scientific consensus, that the
most outrageous jury verdicts (including the award for loss of psychic
powers from a CAT scan) were overturned by trial judges or appellate courts, and that junk science causes more problems in administrative agencies and in the media than in the courtroom.
Huber paints with a broad brush, and he demonstrates little appreciation for the subtleties of the issues he addresses. He appears to
lack the practical experience with litigation that he insists courts
should demand of those who seek to testify as experts. Huber applauds recent state laws establishing standards for expert witnesses
that require substantial familiarity with the procedures in question and
bar testimony by professional experts who spend more than twenty
percent of their time in court or by "academics who do not practice
at all."35 Although I do not necessarily endorse these standards, it
seems fair to apply them to their proponent. Huber has both a J.D.
and Ph.D.; according to the book jacket he is a former law clerk for
a Supreme Court Justice, a Senior Fellow of the Manhattan Institute,

relationship between trauma and cancer were published in the 1920s and 1930s, Huber does
not describe the scientific consensus prior to 1974, so it is not clear whether the medical
testimony supporting the plaintiffs' recoveries in that period was contrary to the current
consensus. Finally, these traumatic cancer cases all were decided during the heyday of the
Frye rule and prior to the promulgation of the FRE, so they provide no support for Huber's
claim that the FRE are responsible for the introduction of junk science.
With respect to la*suits seeking recovery for birth defects, Huber does not describe
the scientific consensus on the relationship between cerebral palsy and birth trauma prior to a
1986 publication in the New England Journal of Medicine which showed an absence of
correlation. Thus, from Huber's evidence it is quite possible that the prevalence of electronic
fetal monitoring and the associated increase in the rate of cesarean sections in the 1970s
reflected the current medical consensus on appropriate treatment, rather than a response to the
risk of legal liability, as Huber claims.
The chapter on accelerating Audis implicated the media far more than the courts.
Although Audi lost a few cases, it won most of them, and the loss in sales was primarily
attributable to negative publicity.
Huber's recounting of the Bendectin and chemical AIDS litigation, if true, portrays
appalling behavior by lawyers and their supposed experts, but in Huber's tale the courts
ultimately seem to have succeeded in separating the wheat from the chaff. Indeed, in their
diverse rulings against the plaintiffs under a variety of inconsistent approaches, the courts
arguably exceeded their authority under the FRE. McCarthy, supra note 4. The Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari in one of the Bendectin cases, and it is likely to clarify
the application of the FRE to expert testimony based on controversial methodologies. Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S.
CL 320 (1992).
35. REvENGF, supra note 1, at 205-06.
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a regular columnist for Forbes magazine, and the author of Liability:
The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences.6 But has Huber been
an active participant in the legal practice that he criticizes? How
many cases has he litigated? Did he even spend a year as a clerk for
a trial judge? Regardless of whether Huber is more accurately labeled
an "academic" or a "professional expert" in the field of litigation science, his credentials certainly do not satisfy his own criterion of
hands-on practical experience.
Huber equates valid science with scientific consensus, and he
extols the virtue of "professional journal and peer review" as criteria
for identification of valid science. 7 So what is the consensus among
leading legal experts in their professional publications on this topic?
All seem to agree that this is a serious problem and that the rules
need to be tightened up and systematized because the dynamic state
of the law has generated substantial unpredictability and yielded an
occasional aberrational decision.3" Revenge stands almost alone, however, in portraying the problem as a crisis. When put to the test in an
academic (though not peer-reviewed) publication, Huber himself admits that the turning point has passed and that courts and legislatures
are responding appropriately. When measured by Huber's standard of
scientific consensus as reflected in academic publication, Revenge is

36. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988) [hereinafter LIABIITY].
37. REVENGE, supra note 1, at 205. Huber's faith in peer review is unwarranted. See
Brief of Amici Curiae Daryl E. Chubin, Ph.D., Edward J. Hackett, Ph.D., David Michael
Ozonoff, M.D., M.P.H., Richard W. Clapp, Sc.D., M.P.H., in Support of Petitioners at 8,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., cert. granted, 113 S. CL 320 (1992) (No. 92102) ("Mhe peer review system is designed to provide a common and convenient starting
point for scientific debate, not the final summation of existing scientific knowledge."); Brief
Amici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science in Support of Petitioners, id
at 16-17. ("But the appearance of a study in a peer-reviewed journal does not necessarily
mean that the study is generally accepted or even sound. Conversely, the fact that a study
has not been published in a peer-reviewed journal does not mean that the study and any
opinion based thereon are unreliable and would of no help in resolving a question of fact.");
see also, Brief of the Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, i& at 26. ("A requirement that all studies must
be peer-reviewed before they can be relied upon by an expert witness presupposes a view of
.... [O]ften the studies that become relevant in
litigation and science at odds with reality
determining a legal issue are initiated in reaction to the litigation process.")
38. For example, the leading works on the standards governing admissibility of scientific
evidence by Margaret Berger, Bert Black, Paul Giannelli, Kenneth Kreiling, Frederic Lederer,
Mark McCormick, Andre Moenssens, Stephen Saltzburg, and James Starts, see supra note 3,
all propose quite modest reinterpretations or revisions of FRE 702; see also FED. R. EVD.
702 (proposed), 137 F.R.D. 156 (1991).
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junk science.
That Huber emphasizes the bad news in Revenge should not
surprise anyone. Good news doesn't sell. That Huber has distorted his
expert opinion, either for pecuniary gain or polemical advantage, may
not be shocking, but it is somewhat ironic. One of the primary reasons for junk science in the courtroom, according to Huber, is the
incentive structure created by the legal environment, which by "unnatural selection" yields expert witnesses who are "hired gun[s]," "saxophones," "hookers," and "Mr. Professional Witness, U.S.A." 39 It appears that experts in litigation science, especially those employed by
ideological think tanks such as the Manhattan Institute, are not immune to such temptations.
II.

CALABRESI'S REVENGE?

One of Huber's most provocative assertions in Revenge is the
claim that Guido Calabresi was responsible for the rise of junk science. 4° Now Dean of the Yale Law School, Calabresi was one of
the founders of modem "Law and Economics."4 1 In contrast to the
conservative "Chicago School" of law and economics, which measures
all legal rules against the presumptive efficiency of the existing market system, Calabresi's "Yale School" recognizes that economic efficiency is only one of many goals of the legal system, and it focuses
on legal rules applicable to transactions in which the market is unlikely to yield an efficient solution.42 These situations of market fail-

39. REVENGE, supra note 1, at 19.
40. See id at 11-13.
41. His leading works include GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS]; Guido Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harty Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHl. L.
REv. 69 (1975) [hereinafter Concerning Cause]; Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and
Accidents, 84 YALE LJ. 656 (1975); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for
Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YAiE LJ. 1055 (1972); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1089 (1972); Guido Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary
Accident Costs, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (1968); Guido Calabresi, Transaction
Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules: A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1968);
Guido Calabresi, Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE
LJ. 216 (1965); Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault
Allocation of Costs, 78 HARe. L. REV. 713 (1965); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE LJ. 499 (1961).
42. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Law, Economics and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986
DUKE LJ. 929. The Journal of Law, Economics and Organization reflects the approach of
the Yale school, just as the Journal of Law and Economics and the Journal of Legal Studies
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ure tend to be characterized by problems that the new Law and Economics refers to as "transaction costs": lack of information,
externalities of cost or benefit, barriers to negotiations, and strategic
behavior by holdouts and free-riders.
Employing a "functional approach," Calabresi has attempted to
formulate a general theory of liability, particularly in the field of
accident law.43 For Calabresi, the principal aim of liability rules is

the reduction of accident costs, which encompasses three sub-goals:
(a) reducing the number and severity of accidents; (b) reducing social
costs resulting from accidents; and (c) reducing administrative costs of
the liability system." Reduction in the number and severity of accidents can be accomplished through "specific deterrence" (or "collective deterrence"), which creates direct incentives for making activities
safer by the threat of imposing liability on the actors, and through
"general deterrence" (or "market deterrence"), which discourages participation in accident-producing activities by raising the effective cost
or price to the participants."
One of Calabresi's chief contributions to current theory is his
conclusion that specific deterrence is most efficiently accomplished by
imposing the cost of accidents on the party who is best able to prevent or avoid the damages, described in shorthand as the "cheapest
cost avoider" of the conflict.' Imposition of legal liability on the
cheapest cost avoider creates incentives for that person to take appropriate precautions, whereas imposition of liability on anyone else will
either create incentives for the wrong person to act, or entail costly
negotiations among the parties to shift responsibility to the appropriate
actor. Calabresi's contribution has been criticized on theoretical
grounds, but Huber is the first to blame Calabresi for the practical
consequences of his theory.
According to Huber, Calabresi's thesis that courts should impose
the accident costs on the cheapest cost avoider gave rise to a new
field of "liability science," a "new school" of "legal academics"
whose "ambitious mission" was to make the common law "a farreaching instrument of social control."47 The search for the cheapest

primarily reflect the approach of the Chicago school.
43. Izhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort
Theory, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 27, 33 (1980).
44. Id.at 36; see also THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 41, at 24-31.
45. See THE CoSTS oF ACCIDENTS, supra note 41, at 68-69, 95-96.
46. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 41, at 1060.
47. REVENGE, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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cost avoider was "a prescription for bringing innumerable new scientific controversies into court." 48 Huber asserts that "more cases began to turn entirely on the science of cause and effect,"4 9 and that
the "Calabresian" search for the cheapest cost avoider induced the
judiciary to open the courtrooms to junk science:
Frye held sway until the 1970s, when it collided with the high
ambition of the Calabresians ....
...
The search for the cheapest possible control must inevitably lead out to the edges of scientific knowledge....
A far-ranging search for causes to control is needed-indeed, it
is needed all the more-when known causes are in short supply.... Whatever we do (many an overeager Calabresian quickly
concludes), we must do something. Perhaps the scientist who claims
ignorance is just too cautious....
Thus, a profession whose declared mission is control, first and
last, will control, one way or another, even if it comes (as it has in
times past) to burning witches. °

So the search for the cheapest cost avoider has led to the burning of witches! Of course, Huber does not provide a single reference
to any "overeager Calabresian" who ever advocated imposing costs on
an activity having no provable causal connection with the plaintiff's
damages. So where is Huber's evidence for the link between Guido
Calabresi and junk science?
Huber points an accusing finger at Calabresi's oft-cited essay
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts,51 stating: "Guido Calabresi
himself argued that liability should be based not on 'cause' but on
'causal linkage,' something weaker, though how much weaker remains
unclear." 2 Huber has misread the essay, and he misunderstands
Calabresi's concept of "causal linkage." Causal linkage is not "something weaker" than actual cause, as Huber claims, but instead represents a genuine scientific approach to the question of causation.
Calabresi's essay on causation explores the functional role of
three distinct concepts of causation: "causal linkage," "but for cause,"
and "proximate cause." While the last two terms are familiar legal

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id at 13.
Id
Id at 15, 21-23.
Concerning Cause, supra note 41.
REVENGE, supra note 1, at 150.
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concepts, the first is explicitly scientific:
The first concept, as I shall use it, is entirely predictive and
empirical. There is a causal link between an act or activity and an
injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that
the recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances that
the injury will also occur 3
Calabresi endorses the flexible and functional approach of the common law courts, which employ all three concepts to promote a variety of policy goals. Application of the concept of causal linkage
certainly demands reliance on scientific and statistical evidence. But
neither in this nor in any of Calabresi's other works is there any hint
of a role for bad science or false claims of causal linkage.
While he criticizes Calabresi's "weak" concept of causal linkage,
Huber never explains what a "strong" scientific definition of causation
would entail. The index entries for "cause, definition of' all refer to
discussions of supposedly wrongheaded definitions of cause by
"Calabresian liability scientists." 5
Huber's own conception of causation appears to be both naive
and self-contradictory. He says: "Causes just are, whether or not we
understand them ... ."55 He purports to "believe in the existence of
objective fact, which ultimately means positive science."' He declares that "science's definition of cause ... is the only one that is
objectively verifiable. This is an utterly safe statement: the domain of
systematic, objective verification is by definition the domain of science."'7 But, following Kuhn, Huber says that "a scientific 'fact' is
the collective judgment of a specialized community."5 8
Well, which is it? Do "causes" exist objectively, without regard
to our understanding of them, or are they social constructs that represent the current collective judgment of the community? I believe that
both Huber and Calabresi would endorse the latter view, at least for
purposes of making legal decisions. Operating within this consensus,
Huber would test the hypothesis of a causal relationship between X
and Y through systematic empirical verification employing accepted

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Concerning Cause, supra note 41, at 71.
REVENGE, supra note 1, at 266.
Id at 222.
Id at 218-19.
Id at 222.

58.

Id at 226 (citing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFC REVOLUTIONS

(2d ed. 1970)).
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methodologies. Such an empirical approach to causation appears to be
precisely what Calabresi means by causal linkage. How, then, can
Huber claim that Calabresi's causal linkage is a "weak" conception of
cause, when it is entirely consistent with Huber's "scientific" approach?
Even if Huber were correct about the demise of the Frye rule
and about the weak conception of cause among Calabresian liability
scientists, his methodology for linking these two phenomena is unacceptable. Huber correctly criticizes experts who intuitively infer a
causal connection between events A and B based on the mere fact of
their temporal sequence.59 Yet even granting Huber his factual premises, he is guilty of precisely the same spurious inference. That is,
he provides no basis for his inference of a causal relationship between the supposed demise of Frye and the supposedly weak concept
of cause among Calabresians. Huber cannot point to a single opinion
in which a court employed bad science for explicitly Calabresian
purposes. 6° Huber is content to rely on the intuitive inference that if
Calabresi advocates imposition of liability on certain enterprises, and
if bad science can be used to impose liability on those enterprises,
then Calabresi must advocate bad science. This is nonsense, and it is
an entirely unfair attack on the work of Dean Calabresi.
Significantly, in the academic article adapted from this book,
Huber drops all reference to Calabresi and "liability science." Guilt
by association may work in the popular press, but Huber knows it
won't wash in a professional journal. Again, measured by Huber's
own standards, Revenge is junk science.
III.

THE NOT-so-HDDEN AGENDA AND THE
UNANSWERED QUESnONS

The gratuitous attack on Dean Calabresi is significant in highlighting Huber's real agenda in Revenge. The ultimate enemy, for
Huber, is not bad science, but "enterprise liability," which was the
object of Huber's wrath in his 1988 work, Liability: The Legal Revo-

lution and Its Consequences ("Liability").

59. Id at 48.

60. Indeed, it is difficult to find opinions in which courts explicitly employ Calabresian
reasoning. Although Calabresi's works are frequently cited by the courts, recent scholarship
suggests that their impact on the substance of tort law has been insignificant. See Izhak
Englard, Law and Economics in American Tort Cases: A Critical Assessment of the Theory's
Impact on Courts, 41 U. TORONTO LJ. 359, 362 (1991).
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"Enterprise liability" refers to the idea that businesses should be
held absolutely responsible, on a no-fault basis, for harms caused by
their goods and services and by any activities relating to their production. Though he was not the originator of the concept, Calabresi
embraced enterprise liability as a means to achieve primary accident
cost reduction. To the extent that an enterprise is the cheapest cost
avoider of certain accidents, enterprise liability achieves efficient
specific deterrence by inducing the enterprise to take cost-effective
precautions. And enterprise liability achieves efficient general or market deterrence by forcing the enterprise to bear the costs of accidents
it causes, thereby "internalizing" those costs so that they will be
reflected in the price of its products.
In Liability, Huber claimed that the American legal system had
adopted the principle of enterprise liability. He then criticized American tort law, asserting that it fails to remove unsafe products from the
market, discourages innovation, and renders safe products unduly
expensive or unavailable. Huber repeats many of these arguments in
chapter ten of Revenge. He contends that regulatory agencies are far
more effective than litigation in uncovering and addressing such scientific and medical problems as swine flu vaccine, cancers from DES,
toxic shock syndrome, the Dalkon Shield, and the exploding Ford
Pinto. He also argues that "[j]unk science verdicts raise prices, lower
production, and deter consumption." 61 Erroneous verdicts or the fear
thereof have driven safe and valuable products off the market (e.g.,
Audis, Bendectin, IUDs). Consequently, consumers suffer from the
absence of these products as well as the higher prices of less.safe
substitutes.
Liability was the subject of a devastating review by Joseph
Page.62 Page rejected Huber's underlying premise that the American
tort system has embraced the concept of enterprise liability,63 and he

61. REVEGE, supra note 1, at 181.
62. Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Refonn, 78 GEo. LJ. 649 (1990) (book review). In
phrases that could also be applied to Revenge, Page said that Liability was "harsh, though
not always original," id at 660; it employed an anecdotal methodology replete with "inaccuracies and distortions," id at 659; it made oversimplified and overstated arguments based on
sketchy evidence, id at 673, 683; it "[rleduc[ed] legal history to caricaturer by fabricating
academic conspiracies that amounted to "flights of fancy" based on spurious causal reasoning,
k at 661, 671; and it was written in "a voice that ranges from brisk to acerbic to meanspirited," id. at 659.

63. Id. at 663-68. Strict liability applies only to "defective" products, and even there a
negligence-like standard is used to determine whether a product is defective ("unreasonably
dangerous") due to a manufacturing defect, a faulty design or an inadequate warning. In the
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disagreed with Huber's criticisms of the system. Page pointed out
numerous instances in which tort law helped remove dangerous products from the market, and he questioned the extent to which the
threat of liability has unduly raised prices or deprived American consumers of new or safe products."
Echoing his earlier book, in chapter nine of Revenge, "Harmonious Coupling," Huber criticizes tort law for allowing the "motherless calf" to be suckled by any cow that "must somehow deserve to
be milked." In addition to reiterating his argument that the law
allows recovery under relaxed standards of causation ("science without
the details"),' Huber complains that the law capriciously selects
risks from the "causation pack" 7 of multiple causal agents by
"[m]inimizing, discounting, overlooking, or omitting the effects of
self-poisoning and self-destruction."68
Ironically, Huber's last argument is essentially Calabresian. That
is, the victims who have it within their power to prevent injuries
caused by alcohol, tobacco, handguns, and automobiles may be the
cheapest cost avoiders of these damages. A Calabresian judge, if any
exist, might well be persuaded by Huber's argument that the assumption of risk or contributory negligence defense should be applied to
accident victims who did not wear seatbelts, to lung cancer victims
who smoked cigarettes, or to victims of pelvic inflammatory disease
from the Dalkon Shield who engaged in non-marital sex.
Another Calabresian approach to these issues, however, would be
to internalize the costs of injuries and accidents to the activities that
generate those costs. The rationale for cost internalization is that the
price of these activities should reflect all of their associated costs, for
otherwise the producers and consumers are receiving an implicit subsidy at the expense of the victims. In Calabresian terms, cost internalization promotes the goal of general or market deterrence by increasing the price of risky activities and inducing consumers to substitute
other less costly activities.
The concept of cost internalization does not, however, answer the

absence of statutory protection, traditional fault-based tort principles continue to govern most
claims for injuries resulting from the conduct of corporate employees or from the by-products
of industrial production.
64. Id. at 678-89.
65. REvENGF, supra note 1, at 149-50.
66. Id. at 155-59.
67. IcL at 159.
68. Id. at 166.
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question of how to internalize the cost when two or more activities
contribute to causing damage or injury. Nobel laureate Ronald
Coase's seminal article emphasized the reciprocal nature of such
conflicts.' Coase pointed out that the cost of crop damage from
straying cattle could be viewed as a cost of cattle-raising or a cost of
farming. Similarly, the cost of injuries from alcohol-induced auto
accidents could be viewed as a cost of driving or a cost of drinking.
If we want to internalize these costs, to what extent should each
activity bear them, and is it better to use liability rules within the
judicial system or turn to the legislature for various combinations of
direct regulation and taxation? These are interesting and important
questions, for which neither science nor economics has easy answers.
The greatest challenge now confronting the American legal system is the question of how to deal with the inherent risks of life in
modem society. Citizens are exposed to risk on a daily basis as drivers, as consumers, as employees, as hospital patients, and in a variety
of other situations. Mainstream science has established that many of
our products and by-products cause measurable increases in the risk
of serious injury and disease. Not just alcohol, cigarettes, handguns
and automobiles, but coal dust, asbestos, hazardous waste, and air and
water pollution all increase these risks. The legal system's response to
statistical risk in the context of "toxic torts" has generated a vast
literature. 0 Toxic tort litigation has raised various issues related to
proof of legal causation, including an emphasis on statistical perspectives on causation in lieu of the traditional mechanistic conception
and an emerging preference for epidemiological evidence in lieu of
the legal system's traditional reliance on hands-on clinical judgment.
The legal system's dilemma is starkly portrayed in the
paradigmatic hypothetical of a toxic agent which is known to raise
the incidence of a particular disease by some specified amount over
the normal background rate for that disease." Suppose the very best
science establishes that exposure to toxic agent X increases the incidence of a particular cancer by twenty-five percent, from 100 cases
per 100,000 citizens in a non-exposed population to 125 cases per
100,000 in an exposed population. In a lawsuit against a defendant

69. R1H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
70. For a "selective bibliography," see Robert F. Blomquist, An Introduction to American Toxic Tort Law: Three Overarching Metaphors and Three Sources of Law, 26 VAL. U.
L REV. 795, 802-05 n.29 (1992).
71. Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1238 (1987) (discussing
leading works that have employed this paradigm).
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responsible for exposing 100,000 citizens to agent X, traditional legal
doctrine might not allow recovery by any of the 125 cancer victims,
because none of them could show that the exposure was the legal
cause of the cancer. In order to recover, each victim would need an
expert to testify that, to a reasonable degree of medical or scientific
certainty, the victim probably would not have developed the disease
in the absence of exposure. Yet for any one victim, an honest expert
would only be able to say that the exposure increased the risk by
twenty-five percent, and that it is more probable than not that the
victim would have developed the disease in any event. 72 One possible alternative would be to allow recovery in full by all 125 cancer
victims, perhaps based on a determination that the exposure was
probably a substantial contributing factor in each case. 3 But this

72. Only if exposure to the toxic agent increased the risk by more than 100% could an
expert testify that a particular victim probably would not have developed the disease in the
absence of exposure. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 95759 (3d Cir. 1990); Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts: Some Proposals
Regarding Alternative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common
Law Courts, 51 U. Pri'. L. REV. 1, 36 (1989); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in
Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851,
856-58 (1984); Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion,and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L. 376, 378 (1986) (criticizing this collapsing
of the standard of persuasion and the burden of proof into a single test).
On the other hand, consistent application of the preponderance of the evidence standard would warrant abandonment of the conventional scientific requirement of 95 percent
"statistical significance' in epideniologic data. The conventional 95 percent confidence level
is unduly conservative, for by limiting the risk of an erroneous attribution of causation (Type
I error) to 5 percent, it creates a far greater risk, possibly as high as 50 percent, of an
erroneous failure to find causation (Type H error). See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, at 945-49, 953-57; Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability:
Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L REV. 385, 409-13
(1985). A better approach involves the use of "confidence intervals." "A confidence interval
is a range of possible values for a parameter that is consistent with the observed data within
specified limits." Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Kenneth Rothman, Noel Weiss, James
Robins, Raymond Neutra, and Steven Stellman, in Support of Petitioners'at 7, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct.
320 (1992) (No. 92-102); see also DeLuca, supra; Cohen, supra. Data can be reported in
terms of the confidence interval for various confidence levels, e.g., 95%, 90%, 80%. The
preponderance of the evidence standard suggests a selection of a confidence interval "that
equalizes the risk of Type I and Type II errors;" despite its "conceptual advantages," such an
approach must be used "heuristically rather than mechanically" due to the impossibility of
computing precise numerical values. Cohen, supra, at 417.
73. See Gold, supra note 72, at 395-96. Alternatively, instead of relying solely on
epidemiologic data, a treating physician or other clinician could base a finding of causation
on a clinical judgment that would reflect the expert's scientific knowledge of the toxic
tendency of the agent combined with particular facts about the individual victim's intensity of
exposure, pattern of symptoms, time of onset, etc. See Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets
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approach arguably provides a windfall to the 100 victims who would
have developed cancer in any event, while imposing a disproportionate penalty on the defendant. And from an economic perspective, this
approach creates too much cost internalization, forcing the defendant
to bear the cost of 125 cancers when it "caused" only 25. Most commentators favor awarding partial damages to all of the victims, with
recoveries proportional to the probability of causation,74 though they
disagree as to whether this can be accomplished through the tort

system or some other institutional arrangement
Huber does not address these issues at all, except insofar as he
would deny all compensation to victims whenever their own activity
had contributed to an increased risk of injury or disease. Perhaps
Huber should not be faulted for failing to explore the meaning of
causation or evaluate the legal standard for imposing liability in toxic
tort litigation, which were not the subjects of his book."5 He can be

the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L REv. 521, 527 (1986)
(suggesting that despite the inconclusive epidemiologic data, clinical evidence supported a
finding of causation for at least some of the Agent Orange plaintiffs). Nesson points out that
the "standard of the treating doctor is the typical juridical standard of proof" in ordinary
litigation. Id. at 528.
74. Farber, supra note 71, at 1220. In the above hypothetical, there is a 25j125 or 20%
chance that the exposure caused the plaintiff's cancer, so each of the 125 plaintiffs would
recover 20% of his or her total damages, while the defendant would be held liable for the
cost of 25 cancers. William Landes and Richard Posner agree that the defendant should be
held liable for the cost of 25 cancers, but they would prefer to divide this sum among all of
the 100,000 exposed individuals as compensation for being subjected to the increased risk of
disease. WILIAM N. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRucruRE Op TORT
LAW 263-69 (1987).
My own view, for what it is worth, is that all 100,000 exposed individuals who are
victims of a legal wrong should recover from the defendant for the scientifically well-founded
fear and emotional distress associated with their increased risk of developing cancer, which is
separate from the cost of the cancer itself. See E. Donald Elliott, The Future of Toxic Torts:
Of Chemophobia, Risk as a Compensable Injury and Hybrid Compensation Systems, 25 Hous.
L REV. 781, 785-90 (1988); Jeff L. Lewin, Is Justice Implicitly Efficient?, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 423, 435 & n.24 (1988) (book review of LANDES & POSNER, supra). With regard to
the cost of the extra 25 cancers, the common law is incapable of justly or efficiently allocating their cost via the tort system. Instead, the goal of fair compensation could be fulfilled by
having a government insurance program make payments to all 125 cancer victims, while the
principle of responsibility and the goal of deterrence beth could be satisfied by a regulatory
scheme that required the defendant to reimburse the insurance program for the cost of the
extra 25 cancers it caused.
75. On the other hand, by examining the. problem of junk science in isolation from this
context, Huber fails to recognize that the scientifically distorted expert opinions about causation are the inevitable concomitant of a tort system that provides compensation only for
actual injury and not for the increased risk of disease and the fear thereof. See Elliott, supra
note 74, at 786 (Mhe unreasonably demanding standard of traditional tort law virtually
compels plaintiffs' lawyers to use experts who will distort the available scientific evidence.").
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blamed, however, for his attempt to distort the debate by creating the
impression that the imposition of liability on enterprises for their
products and by-products has been based on bad science, and worse,
that the proponents of enterprise liability are responsible for bad
science in the courtroom.
The fact that judges usually succeed in keeping junk science out
of the courtroom does not mean that junk science is not a problem.
Huber is probably correct that fear of liability is keeping some safe
and useful products off the market For example, the recent $5.1
million verdict against Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation for birth
defects supposedly caused by its spermicide was procured with expert
testimony based on a preliminary study that subsequently was repudiated by its authors. Though its scientific basis is questionable, the
verdict has raised concern about the continued availability of such
products.
Because contraception, pregnancy, and childbirth are the source
of peculiar risks and immense liability exposure, women are likely to
be the principal victims of corporate fear of legal liability. The threat
of liability arguably has already deprived American women of safe
and effective birth control by temporarily driving safe LUDs off the
market, deprived them of a drug (Bendectin) that would relieve severe
symptoms of morning sickness during pregnancy, and subjected them
to unnecessary Caesarean-section operations prompted by false distress
signals from electronic fetal monitoring during labor.
Corporate fears ought to be allayed by recent legal developments.
In chapter eleven of Revenge, "Stopping Points,"76 Huber applauds
the courts and legislatures that have adopted various measures aimed
at keeping junk science out of the courtroom or minimizing the likelihood of erroneous verdicts based on junk science. The Bendectin
litigation has provided the federal courts with an opportunity to experiment with a variety of doctrinal devices for precluding awards
based on controversial scientific evidence, most of which have resulted in dismissal of the plaintiffs' cases.
Revenge has succeeded in heating up the debate about the legal
system's response to controversial scientific evidence, but it fails to
illuminate the difficult doctrinal dilemma confronting the courts. In
his fanatic devotion to Frye, Huber essentially has ignored the various
criticisms of the rule that led many courts to reject or modify it in

76. This chapter is reproduced almost verbatim as the second half of Huber's law
review adaptation. Huber, supra note 28, at 739-55.
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civil litigation.' Several years ago, a distinguished group of symposium participants "reached a consensus that the screening function of
Frye should be retained, but that the wording should be improved to
promote clarity in the procedure and certainty in its effect."'8 Even
the President's -Council on Competitiveness departed from Frye's
strict "general acceptance" standard and would have allowed testimony based on "widely accepted" theories that could include "respected
minority" viewpoints. 9 Huber is so result-oriented that he applauds
every "strict scrutiny" opinion that bars recovery by a plaintiff, and
he fails to recognize that these opinions are inconsistent with the FRE
and with each other.ro Revenge is therefore of no value to the
Justices of the Supreme Court who will decide Daubert or to anyone
contemplating a revision of the rules of evidence to refine the standards governing admissibility and presentation of expert testimony.
No matter how effective the courts may be in keeping junk
science out of the courtroom, citizens and consumers will be deprived
of safe or affordable products if corporate executives are deluded into
believing that their enterprises face a serious threat of liability for
tragedies they did not cause. Existing corporate concerns about the
liability system may well be irrational or exaggerated s and Revenge
seems calculated to encourage a paranoid perspective.
Elsewhere, Huber has noted: "Junk science's one very real power
is to stir up fear." 2 In Revenge, Huber harnesses the power of junk

77. This review is not the place for a reiteration of the debate over the merits of the
Frye rule and its role within the FRE. Judge Becker ably summarized the arguments for
adoption of the competing relevancy test in United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d
Cir. 1985), and Judge Stapleton carefully applied the test to the Bendectin litigation in
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). I am not alone
in finding these opinions persuasive. See, e.g., WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 23; McCarthy, supra note 4. My only reservation is that not all trial judges are capable of rigorously
applying the relevancy test as described in these two opinions. The question remains whether
the costs of litigation under the more flexible relevancy test (i.e., an occasional "erroneous"
verdict, the added cost of litigating cases that otherwise would have been dismissed earlier in
litigation, and the chilling effect from the threat of litigation and erroneous verdicts under
such a rule) outweigh the costs of error and unfairness from rigid application of the Frye
rule in civil litigation.
78. William A. Thomas, Editor, Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99
F.R.D. 188, 234 (1983) (summarizing working group reports from Professors Berger, Graham

and Moenssens).
79. See Hensler, supra note 10, at 247; Quayle, supra note 12, at 566.
80. For a persuasive critique of the leading opinions, see McCarthy, supra note 4.
81. Page, supra note 62, at 679-80.
82. Huber, supra note 28, at 754 (discussing the debilitating effects of phobias induced
by public belief in pseudoscience).
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litigation science to stir up fear of the tort system, purveying the
pernicious myth that junk science is rampant in our courts and that
liability frequently is imposed without a well-founded scientific basis.
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